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This paper examines Bitcoin from a legal and regulatory perspective, 
answering several important questions. 
We begin by explaining what Bitcoin is, and why it matters. We describe 
problems with Bitcoin as a method of implementing a cryptocurrency. This 
introduction to cryptocurrencies allows us eventually to ask the inevitable 
question: is it legal? What are the regulatory responses to the currency? Can it 
be regulated? 
We make clear why virtual currencies are of interest, how self-regulation has 
failed, and what useful lessons can be learned. Finally, we produce useful and 
semi-permanent findings into the usefulness of virtual currencies in general, 
blockchains as a means of mining currency, and the profundity of Bitcoin as 
compared with the development of block chain technologies. We conclude 
that though Bitcoin may be the equivalent of Second Life a decade later, so 
blockchains may be the equivalent of Web 2.0 social networks, a truly 
transformative social technology. 
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1. Introduction: The hype about Bitcoin as a cryptocurrency 
In 2008, the developed world banking system almost collapsed and had to be 
rescued by sovereign governments via takeovers of bad banks with bad loans, 
and the printing of money to loan to major banks, whether rescued or 
surviving. In the long recession of 2008 to 2014, governments supported their 
economies with a variety of means. With close to zero inflation and interest 
rates, governments had to find ways to stimulate some economic growth. They 
fell on three main solutions: limited stimulus via infrastructure spending, such 
as the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009; support for ICT-
enabled, often environmentally sustainable industries to create new ‘virtual’ 
growth in the digital economy [1], some of it linked to the first option [2]; 
quantitative easing or the printing of money given to banks at low interest 
rates. Mason reports that the “[United States of] America and Britain did it 
first, in early 2009; Japan waded in massively in 2012 and the Eurozone 
finally did it, in the teeth of German resistance, in January this year.” [3] 
Reactions to the rescuing of banks were mixed, with many of those opposed to 
the policy either resorting to investment in commodities and bullion, for 
instance property and gold (which rose in value 350 percent 2006–12, and is 
still double 2006 levels at over US$1,100/ounce). Others chose a more radical 
path. Iceland bankrupted its banks and massively devalued its currency [4]. It 
then adopted a series of policies that alienated the population in a severe 
recession. In late 2015, the largest party by popular support is the Icelandic 
Pirate Party [5], which proposes far wider use of virtual currencies which 
would not rely on sovereign support. We should also note that throughout the 
years of recession (most developed economies regained 2008 levels of income 
after six years, with the notable exception of Greece and Iceland), the 
wealthiest quartile of the population invested massively in the “Apple 
economy”, spending sovereign currency on a billion iPhones and other 
consumer electronics and services such as NetFlix movies and Amazon 
purchases. Rejection of the mass consumer economic model funded by debt is 
by no means universal or even a majority view. 
In January 2011, an aspiring entrepreneur called Ross Ulbricht created an 
online marketplace called Silk Road [6]. This was not just another electronic 
commerce Web site, Silk Road was unique in almost all of its features. First, it 
was not available on the normal Web. It existed in an encrypted and secretive 
part of the Internet called the ‘dark Net’ [7]. Second, it offered a range of 
illegal merchandise not found on eBay or Amazon, mostly drugs, catering to 
discerning users by offering customer reviews and vendor ratings. Third, the 
Silk Road was able to operate because it used a new virtual currency called 
Bitcoin that allowed users to remain anonymous and conduct transactions with 
little fear of interference by law enforcement. 
While the Silk Road was eventually shut down and its creator arrested and 
convicted [8], the publicity that the case garnered for Bitcoin helped to 
establish it in the public’s imagination as a powerful sign of the probabilities 
of the digital economy. The currency has even transcended the financial pages 
to be featured in popular television shows like The Good Wife, Almost Human 
and The Simpsons. Even the famous Winklevoss twins, of Facebook fame, 
have become heavy investors. Academics have published many social science 
papers about Bitcoin since 2011, with increasing regularity: six by the end of 
2012, 19 in 2013 and 135 since the beginning of 2014 until August 2015 [9]. It 
is not merely an academic fashion: many books have been published in the 
period since we published a working paper on which this work is based [10], 
from the how-to-get-rich-quick variety [11] to the revolutionary [12] and its 
anti-thesis [13] to regulatory [14] and even academic [15]. Inevitably, a ‘burst 
the bubble’ anti-hype book concludes that: “There are fewer people using 
bitcoins to buy goods and services than there are members enrolled in Kuwait 
Airways frequent flyer program. And yet ... the blockchain technology behind 
bitcoin, is brilliant and will absolutely change the world.” [16] We shared that 
conclusion in 2014 and continue to do so today. 
This paper will look at Bitcoin from a legal and regulatory perspective, 
answering several important questions. We begin by explaining what Bitcoin 
is, and why it matters. In the following section, we explain problems with 
Bitcoin as a method of implementing a cryptocurrency. We are aware that the 
introductory section may seem extensive, and that including a very detailed 
description of currencies and Bitcoin may seem basic at this level. This is done 
on purpose, because in our experience whenever there is talk of Bitcoin and 
blockchains, non-technical audiences tend to miss the importance of some 
developments because they do not understand the basics. It is one of the goals 
of this article to be able to act as an easy introduction to cryptocurrencies. We 
ask the inevitable question for lawyers: is it legal? What are the regulatory 
responses to the currency? Can it be regulated? We explain why virtual 
currencies are of interest, how self-regulation has failed, and what useful 
lessons can be learned. Finally, we produce useful and semi-permanent 
findings into the usefulness of virtual currencies in general, block chains as a 
means of mining currency, and the profundity of ‘media darling’ currency 
Bitcoin as compared with the development of blockchain technologies [17]. 
We conclude that though Bitcoin may be the equivalent of Second Life, so 
blockchains may be the equivalent of Web 2.0 social networks, a truly 
transformative social technology. 
  
 
2. Introduction to Bitcoin 
2.1. Virtual currencies 
There is a voluminous literature on regulation of virtual economies [18], 
virtual communities [19] and a fast emerging literature on Bitcoin itself [20]. 
From Facebook Credits to Bitcoin (BTC), virtual currencies have had a bumpy 
evolution. Virtual currencies are wildly successful in their respective in-game 
economies, they are used by millions to buy goods and services in limited 
virtual environments, and it has been proven that people will pay real cash to 
boost their online content [21]. Amazon has announced that it will be 
launching its own virtual currency for their Kindle app store, Amazon Coins. 
Amazon Coins will almost certainly be used exclusively within the Kindle 
environment to buy content for the Kindle, such as books, music, movies and 
TV shows. This replicates earlier uses of reward schemes to regular shoppers, 
from air miles and airline rewards, to Green Shield stamps in the 1960s and 
1970s, to the Cooperative Society’s dividends and stamps, and the now-
ubiquitous reward programmes of online merchants. 
Virtual communities can create social networks but also valuable goods and 
services for other users [22]. This value is generally exchangeable for real 
world currencies, as in the largest role-player community World of Warcraft 
with an economy measurable in the billions of U.S. dollars, though the largest 
social network Facebook uses sovereign currencies as do its third party games 
developers [23]. Most virtual community developers have historically claimed 
ownership of everything hosted in their servers, making them the ‘sovereign’ 
in the community [24]. This may include items with real-world value, such as 
virtual currency converted into real cash by the means of some exchange, as 
when players of online games purchase gold and in-game currencies from 
Chinese ‘gold’ farmers, creating tools for World of Warcraft and other virtual 
communities [25]. Some virtual communities have gone further, developing 
virtual currencies that can be accepted in other communities. 
Bitcoin has taken a further step, as it is a virtual currency that claims to be 
tradable in exactly the same fashion as sovereign currencies, yet without a 
sovereign. We now explain the basics of currencies before examining 
Bitcoin’s challenges to that model. 
2.2. Currency basics 
Bitcoin is a non-fiat cryptographic electronic payment system that purports to 
be the world’s first cryptocurrency. In other words, it is a peer-to-peer, client-
based, completely distributed currency that does not depend on centralised 
issuing bodies (a ‘sovereign’) to operate. The value is created by users, and the 
operation is distributed using an open source client that can be installed on any 
computer or mobile device. In order to better understand Bitcoin, we will 
discuss currencies in general, and electronic currencies specifically. 
Payment systems in general, and currency specifically, depend on value. 
Value is simply the desirability that someone allocates to something, generally 
material items according to our needs, such as food and shelter, or according 
to their scarcity, such as gold; we also give value to energy in the shape of 
labour. Finally, we value intangibles, such as experience, knowledge, 
creativity and know-how [26]. 
Currencies were invented as a means to transfer value. Initially, this was done 
through barter, and then people started allocating value to coins using metals 
that were considered inherently valuable for their scarcity. In the Renaissance 
in Europe [27], as coins became unwieldy, a more flexible system of value 
embedded in paper money was devised in order to make transactions easier, as 
carrying gold and silver bullion was insecure and expensive [28]. The first 
paper notes worked as a promise to give the bearer the equivalent value in 
metal to the one inscribed on the document. Money therefore relied on the idea 
that the issuer had metal reserves that could be redeemed at any time, hence 
giving value to a given currency. The problem with this system, called the 
gold or silver standard [29], is that it placed a limit on the amount of money 
that could be exchanged at any given time by the issuer to that which could be 
allocated to metal reserves, therefore creating an upper limit to the size of the 
economy that was equal to the available metal (expansion of empire was often 
motivated and financed in part by the desire to gain gold and silver reserves, 
as for the Spanish and Portuguese in South America and British in South 
Africa). When a country needed to issue more money than it had in metal 
reserves, such as during time of war, this could result in devaluation, as people 
would not trust that there were reserves that supported the money. 
During the twentieth century the gold standard was abandoned, and a new 
monetary system was put in place that uses a country’s wealth and economic 
trustworthiness as the basis for value. This is what is known as fiat [30] 
money. Modern fiat currencies have value based on the economic strength of 
the issuer. In some libertarian and anarchist circles, it is said that fiat money 
does not have any inherent value, but this fails to recognise that neither does 
the gold standard [31]. Gold does not have intrinsic value; under the right 
circumstances gold could be valueless except as an industrial input. In fact, 
there is no such thing as inherent value; all value is dependent on 
circumstances. The value in fiat money arises from the law, the currency has 
the support of the government as sovereign, and therefore, it is supported by 
the economy of the territory where it is accepted. Trusted governments support 
strongly valued currencies, though governments permitting hyperinflation can 
destroy that trust. 
2.3. Bitcoin 
Bitcoin was developed in 2008 as a concept by an anonymous developer going 
by the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto, who posted a paper detailing the 
currency to a cryptography mailing list [32]. The paper details a decentralised 
system with no issuing authority that would serve as both a means of exchange 
but also as an anonymous and fully open log of all transactions (known as the 
blockchain). People running a client that would “mine” value by verifying 
transactions would create the value, which encourages users to allocate 
processor time to confirm trades. 
The paper gained some traction in cryptology circles, and it was coupled with 
the anonymous registration of the Bitcon.org domain, as well as the release on 
9 January 2009 of the first version of the Bitcoin client [33]. The currency 
continued to become more popular, but it was not until the creation of the Silk 
Road in 2011 that it achieved more mainstream notice [34]. 
Bitcoin was devised as a non-fiat currency; in other words, its proponents 
claim that it has “real” value. The value arises from computing power, that is, 
the only way to create new coins is by allocating distributed CPU power 
through computer programs named “miners”. The miners create a block after a 
period of time that is worth an ever-decreasing amount of bitcoins in order to 
ensure scarcity. Each bitcoin consists of 100 million smaller units, with each 
unit called a satoshi. The operations performed to mine are precisely to 
authenticate other transactions, so the system both creates value and 
authenticates itself, an elegant and simple solution that is one of the appealing 
aspects of the currency. Once created, each Bitcoin (or 100 million satoshis) 
exists as a cryptographic address that is part of the block that gave birth to it. 
The person who mined the coin owns the address, and can transfer it by 
sending value to a another address, which is a “wallet” file stored in a 
computer. The blockchain is the public record of all transactions. 
Another way of looking at the currency is that Bitcoin is simply allocating 
value arbitrarily to a program that performs the mathematical equations 
necessary to support the creation of a bitcoin. It is a self-referential and 
circular currency, and its only value is that which people give it, just like fiat 
money, but with faith placed in computer programming, not sovereign states. 
Why do people use Bitcoin and dedicate computing resources to mine them? 
One obvious element would be profit, but even before mining was profitable, 
there were thousands of people dedicating resources and efforts to the 
currency. Any visit to a Bitcoin discussion forum provides evidence that an 
important core of the BTC community consists of libertarian types of all 
stripes, from those who want to see the end of all fiat currencies, to slightly 
more moderate and pragmatic supporters [35]. A libertarian tinge permeates 
some of the most vocal currency’s proponents, who attack established fiat 
currencies, which they see as anathema to the system of value established by 
the gold standard. However, most seem to accept that coexistence will be 
prevalent. 
A more nuanced picture of the user base is beginning to emerge. Liu 
conducted a survey of over a thousand cryptocurrency enthusiasts in various 
Web sites, and found that the average BTC user is a 32-year-old libertarian 
male, motivated by curiosity, profit and politics [36]. Yelowitz and Wilson 
conducted a large study using Google Trends data from the United States, and 
found that computer science and illegal activity were some of the most 
prevalent topics linked with Bitcoin, with less correlation to political discourse 
and investment [37]. 
Bitcoin adoption may be motivated by a various number of features, including 
transparency, politics, anonymity and its use in illegal activities. Studying 
community dynamics is therefore made much more difficult than even such 
pseudonymous or avatar based communities as Habbo Hotel, World of 
Warcraft or Second Life. The ethical implications of studying such 
communities raise similar problems as those of Tor, Anonymous [38], Lulzsec 
and other anonymous hacker communities [39]. Journalistic accounts of 
BitCoin markets are largely subject to sensationalism, hype and inaccuracy, 
even more so than in the earlier hype cycle for Second Life, exacerbated by 
the first issue of anonymity. Ideally, a decentralized currency should be 
politically neutral and strive to be efficient. Any ’revolutionary effects‘ would 
be caused by its success, not as part of a plan to bring about a libertarian 
utopia [40]. 
2.4. Scarcity and economic value in Bitcoin 
An important part of the concept behind Bitcoin is that it has built-in scarcity 
because mining for coins becomes more difficult as time goes by and the 
market grows [41]. The algorithms that produce new BTC coins increase the 
amount of processing power necessary to create each new block, so producing 
new coins is more difficult. This difficulty is built into the system to in order 
to keep the total amount of Bitcoins at a maximum of 21 million. 
The first block ”mined“ was at difficulty 1, and this is known as the genesis 
block [42]. By June 2011, there were 131,301 blocks, making a total BTC of 
6,560,000, and a difficulty of 877,227. In June 2014, there were 303,162 
blocks with a total 12,800,000 BTC in existence, and a difficulty of over 10 
billion. At the time of writing (June 2015), there were 359,657 blocks and just 
over 14 million BTC had been mined, with a difficulty of over 47.5 billion. 
That means, making a new block is more than 47 billion times more difficult 
than it was for the initial block, and four times more difficult than it was 
exactly one year before. This difficulty will only go up, so an individual 
cannot hope to have the processing power to develop new coins, and this can 
only be done currently through pool mining CPU resources [43]. 
While this model is trying to replicate scarcity in the market, it acts as a 
punishing disadvantage for late adopters, and means that early adopters have 
market power if they hoarded coins. This may have regulatory repercussions 
in the future. 
Because late adopters and interested individuals cannot hope to mine new 
coins, the BTC economy relies on users buying bitcoins with fiat currencies 
through exchanges. These are companies that hold bitcoins and are willing to 
sell them at an exchange rate. In other words, intermediaries will accept your 
“normal” currency and exchange it into bitcoins, and vice versa [44]. For most 
large part of its early history, Bitcoin relied very heavily on one intermediary, 
a Tokyo-based company called Mt. Gox. There have been dozens of 
exchanges, as in theory literally anyone could set up their own firm. Mt. Gox 
was famous for having started out as an outfit to trade “Magic the Gathering” 
cards, but then evolved to be the largest exchange. Ron and Shamir found that 
Mt. Gox had intervened in 90 percent of all Bitcoin transactions ever recorded 
[45]. In the same study, they found that there is some large accumulation of 
the bulk of Bitcoin activity, for example, one single user (Mt. Gox itself) had 
156,722 different addresses. This level of centrality is not good for a 
supposedly decentralized currency. Many blips in price prior to the crash were 
caused precisely by DDoS attacks against Mt. Gox [46]. As we will discuss 
later, Mt. Gox became embroiled in serious fraud accusations. Similarly, such 
reliance makes the entire system less resilient and prone to catastrophic 
failures, but we will analyse those issues later. 
2.5. Altcoins 
Bitcoin has undoubtedly become the most talked about cryptocurrency, but it 
is easy to forget that it began mostly as a proof of concept. Because the 
software is completely open source [47], any developer can download it, 
modify it and create her own version of the software. This capability has led to 
an explosion of alternative bitcoin implementations, popularly known as 
altcoins. There are no limits to the number of altcoins that can be released, but 
in practice there are a few dozen real alternatives that implement minor or 
major changes; these are known as forks. 
There is no single reason why a developer should fork the original code and 
create their own version. Some may do it to improve the code, to create better 
security, to modify some of the existing parameters, as a joke, or to attempt to 
convert altcoins into bitcoins [48]. 
Some of the most popular implementations are: 
• IxCoin (IXC): The International eXchange Coin [49] is the first Bitcoin 
clone. It was released in 2011 and it can be mined at the same time as 
BTC. It also has a limit of 21 million coins, but much shorter mining 
period (all coins should have been mined in 2015). 
• Namecoin (NMC): It is one of the most innovative altcoins [50]. It uses 
Bitcoin to create a decentralised domain name system outside of the 
existing international system operated by ICANN. The service allows 
the registration of domain names that cannot be shut down or taken 
over by law enforcement. 
• Litecoin (LTC): This is one of the more popular Bitcoin alternatives 
[51], it was created specifically to fix perceived shortcomings in BTC, 
and it boasts faster transaction verification times and improved storage 
efficiency. 
• Ripple (XRP): In the strict sense, Ripple is not a direct Bitcoin fork 
[52], but it borrows some of the main ideas of Bitcoin, such as being an 
open source decentralised ledger. It is a currency, but also it acts as an 
exchange protocol for existing currencies and altcoins. 
• Dogecoin: This started as a joke BTC fork in 2013 [53], but quickly 
became a currency in its own right, with a 2015 estimated market 
capitalisation of over US$15 million [54], making it the fourth most 
popular altcoin. The name comes from Doge, the popular Internet 
meme [55]. 
• Bitcoin XT: This is a very recent and controversial fork [56] to the 
original Bitcoin source code that adds two main changes, the block size 
is increased and it removes the need to download the entire blockchain. 
2.6. Key benefits 
While it can be argued that Bitcoin has become better known in technology 
circles, at least at the time of writing, it still continues to fall short of wider 
recognition and dissemination. Even though the currency has achieved a non-
negligible market capitalisation of US$3.2 billion in 2015 [57], this is still 
relatively small [58]. Similarly, the indicators for economic activity in the 
currency, such as trade volume, have remained relatively small [59]. Bitcoin 
continues on despite this relative obscurity, and some other problems that will 
be detailed later in this paper. 
There are various problems with existing financial markets and currencies that 
cryptocurrency is trying to address. Some of the benefits of cryptocurrrency 
are: 
• Transparency: One of the key benefits of Bitcoin is that all 
transactions are publicly available and verifiable in the electronic 
ledger called the blockchain [60]. This provides an unprecedented level 
of transparency and peer verification; it is one of the features that 
transcends currency elements. 
• Security: Bitcoin uses the 256-bit version of the secure hash algorithm 
(SHA), an encryption protocol designed by the U.S. National Security 
Agency. The protocol maintains the integrity of the blockchain, but is 
also used to sign and secure BTC wallets, providing a mathematical 
proof that transactions are performed from the owner of the wallet. The 
signature also prevents the transaction from being altered by anybody 
once it has been issued [61]. 
• Lower transaction costs: While in theory Bitcoin transactions could be 
free between all parties, the system usually has transaction fees that 
vary from one exchange to the other [62]. Usually, the transaction fee 
will go to the miner (as an incentive to miners), and these transaction 
fees are a function of difficulty [63]. Even with these fees, Bitcoin still 
boasts lower transaction costs when compared to other payment 
methods, with some merchants estimating that the average is at one 
percent, as opposed to other intermediary clearinghouses such as 
PayPal and Western Union, which charge from two to four percent 
[64]. However, it must be noted that some researchers believe that low 
transaction costs will not sustainable in the future [65]. 
• Anonymity: Bitcoin is theoretically anonymous. A person in possession 
of BTC in an encrypted wallet can spend it in any service without 
identification. While the anonymity aspect has clearly made it 
attractive as a means of payment for illegal goods and services [66], it 
could be used for less nefarious purposes, such as funding campaigners 
in authoritarian regimes [67]. 
• Resilience: Bitcoin is a decentralised currency with no central 
authority and no issuing body. This means that it is resilient to attacks, 
and in theory it also means that it cannot be brought down [68]. 
• Engine for innovation: While it is easy to ignore some grandiose 
claims made by some Bitcoin developers, such as the claim that it will 
destroy fiat currencies, or that it has the potential to combat poverty 
and oppression [69], it cannot be denied that its creation has given a 
much needed push towards innovation in the way in which we think 
about money, financial institutions and centrality. Anything that 
encourages innovation is to be welcomed. 
This list is not exhaustive and only shows some of the most cited benefits of 
the virtual currency. There are some benefits that are more difficult to 
quantify. For example, there is little doubt that whatever may happen with 
Bitcoin, its creation has revolutionised how we think about money, value and 
payments in general. It is possible to be sceptical of Bitcoin, yet to be awed by 
its elegance and the ambitious nature of its implementation. Even if it were to 
disappear tomorrow, it is possible that some applications of the technology 
will survive. We will deal with these in the next section. 
  
 
3. Problems with the current implementation 
While it is clear that Bitcoin has some attractive features, it also has some 
serious problems that have translated into it not being adopted in the 
mainstream. Some of the main concerns are listed below, in no particular 
order. 
3.1. Lack of transparency 
A main selling points of Bitcoin is transparency. The client itself is open 
source and all transactions are open to scrutiny because all transactions must 
be verified by the whole, so it is possible to look at each individual transaction 
in the public blockchain to scrutinise outgoing and incoming wallet addresses. 
The addresses do not identify the person, only the possessor of the key that 
unlocks the address. This makes it both anonymous and transparent at the 
same time, a feature that explains Bitcoin’s popularity with the technical 
community. 
However, this transparency is in practice limited when one considers the 
currency’s origins. Satoshi Nakamoto, the fabled originator of the scheme, 
remains anonymous to this day. It is a matter of record that Bitcoin was 
created by a member (or members) of a cryptography mailing list using 
Nakamoto as a pseudonym. Some suspect that Bitcoin operates in a manner 
similar to a Ponzi scheme, where those early adopters at the top amassed large 
BTC stocks, so that the resulting coins can be easily manipulated. The barrier-
to-entry is not only physically high (difficulty increases with time), but also a 
psychological investment for anyone who understands how easy it would for 
an early adopter to maliciously manipulate the market. 
The fact that some investors have amassed large BTC fortunes is an indication 
that this could be used to leverage the market. There have been several 
examples of possible market manipulation, with sudden large volumes in trade 
used to shift the price up or down [70]. There is also growing evidence that 
bots have been involved in currency-price manipulation on a large scale, with 
some analysts identifying a trading bot (nicknamed ‘Willy’) as being 
potentially responsible for inflating the price until it reached US$1,300 per 
bitcoin [71]. 
It seems increasingly indefensible for Satoshi Nakamoto to remain 
anonymous, particularly given the potential power of early adopters and the 
creators of the scheme. For such a transparent currency from a technical 
standpoint, this remains a rather difficult area for outsiders. 
3.2. Failing anonymity 
Anonymity is one of the biggest selling points for Bitcoin. This was made 
evident after an article in the Atlantic described Silk Road, a site where drugs 
could be acquired using Bitcoins [72]. BTC’s value increased, usage increased 
and mining rigs were created using supercomputers and graphic cards. 
Because the currency is encrypted, there is theoretically no method to trace 
any given transaction to individual users. However, many papers express 
serious doubts on the much-heralded anonymity present in Bitcoin. Reid and 
Harrigan [73] warned that Bitcoin’s much-touted anonymity was seriously 
flawed: 
“Many organizations and services such as on-line stores that 
accept Bitcoins, exchanges, laundry services and mixers have 
access to identifying information regarding their users, e.g., e-
mail addresses, shipping addresses, credit card and bank account 
details, IP addresses, etc. If any of this information was publicly 
available, or accessible by, say, law enforcement agencies, then 
the identities of users involved in related transactions may also 
be at risk.” [74] 
As a case study, they used a highly-publicised theft of 25,000 BTCs (with a 
value at the time of theft of approximately US$500,000). They were able to 
follow the involved transactions using their network tools, and charted these 
with high level of accuracy. They concluded that using network analysis and 
network representation it is possible to map many users to their public keys. 
Furthermore, an interested party could potentially try to find more information 
by targeting centralised services, such as exchanges and online wallet services 
[75]. 
Ober and Hamacher found that maximum anonymity is simply not possible, 
and that there are many points in which it would be possible for an ‘adversary’ 
to identify a party successfully [76]. This can be achieved because many 
addresses are known in advance, such as addresses that originate from popular 
long-running mining pools. The number of operators in the Bitcoin economy 
has been increasing as a function of price, but the authors were able to identify 
some large players, allocating an identity to some BTC public key addresses 
[77]. It would be possible for an observer to start identifying addresses, 
continuously updating the list based on incoming transactions, and using 
merging of coins to identify two separate entities as a single one. Eventually it 
would be possible to identify large coin owners when they merge their coins. 
Furthermore, Bitcoin users usually need to rely on intermediaries in order to 
purchase bitcoins, and most of these require identifying information to open an 
account. This data could be used to de-anonymise the user [78]. To respond to 
these threats, some services have been created that allows users to ‘mix’ their 
coins swapping them and changing them from one address to another, 
providing further anonymity, albeit with mixed results [79]. 
Bitcoin anonymity ultimately fails because users cannot help but operate in the 
real world. The arrest of Ross Ulbricht offers an excellent example of 
someone who had astounding levels of security and anonymity, but was 
eventually brought down because he made small mistakes that eventually 
accumulated, making it possible for law enforcement to find him [80]. This is 
not a problem in itself with BTC, but it serves as a timely reminder that online 
activity is eventually subject to regulation. 
3.3. Instability 
Bitcoin has been tremendously unstable throughout its trading history. While 
generally the overall trend has been upward if we compare today’s value with 
that of four years ago [81], the currency has crashed several times and the 
price continues to swing up and down repeatedly. During its peak in 
December 2013, the price reached US$1,147 per 1BTC (higher in some 
exchanges), only to crash spectacularly to US$522 in just a few days. Needless 
to say, such instability is one of the reasons why it is very unlikely to be a 
viable currency. Imagine that you are a merchant who decides to accept BTC, 
and agree with a buyer to sell at the trading rate when the transaction was 
initiated. The first problem you would encounter is that the transaction needs 
to be verified, and as there are more verifications taking place all the time, the 
process takes longer (about an hour). With wild variations in price, it is 
possible that you could lose money even before the transaction has been 
completed. Moreover, even a minor downward swing, which are too common 
throughout its trading history, could wipe away any profit. 
Bitcoin’s price has stabilised somewhat in the last year, but it still can suffer 
swings of up to US$20 in price. This makes it too unstable and seems to be 
keeping away investors, making it an unreliable means of payment [82]. Price 
instability could be part of the decentralised nature of the technology. Yglesias 
argues that it may continue to vary cyclically in price [83]: 
“If everyone’s hoarding their Bitcoins, then the network is 
actually useless. Since it turns out to be useless, you get a crash. 
The funny thing is that once the upward spiral comes to an end, 
the technological virtues of the Bitcoin platform come to the 
fore again.” 
Fiat money is kept stable by all sorts of means, from fiscal policies to 
centralized decisions about interest rates, with devaluation or revaluation 
largely managed by central banks and governments to ensure an orderly 
change of equilibrium. Panics were caused in 2008 with the sudden 
devaluation of the Swiss franc and Icelandic krona, or in 1998 with the 
devaluation of the Russian rouble and other currencies. It is possible that 
stability can only be achieved through centralization. Others have proposed 
more libertarian methods of creating stability [84], but at the moment there is 
no solution as long as the currency remains mostly a speculative vehicle, and 
not so much a currency for paying for goods and services. 
3.4. Lack of replicability 
In danger of over simplifying a complex issue, Bitcoin is nothing more than 
the ownership of a cryptographic address. In reality, most bitcoins exist only 
as files in a computer or mobile device; a wallet file has access to a private key 
used to secure the money. This creates one of the biggest issues with Bitcoin 
to date: the ease of losing one. If the wallet file is lost, then the bitcoins it 
contains are lost forever [85]. There are ways to back up the keys, such as by 
keeping physical copies off-line and similarly the key files can be backed up. 
But if a backup fails, the value will be forever lost. It is simply irretrievable 
unless one breaks the very secure encryption built into the system. The public 
address still exists, but this can only be accessed by the private key, which has 
been deleted and it would not be possible to recover the lost coins. 
There are indications that there are large numbers of lost coins in the system. 
Ron and Shamir examined very old “dormant” addresses in the blockchain, 
and assumed that these were probably lost coins from a time when people 
were testing the technology and deleted their wallets [86]. The authors 
calculated the historical number of lost coins to be 1,657,480 bitcoins. 
Considering the certainty of later losses, the total value of lost coins could 
very well double that number. Developer John Ratcliff conducted a similar 
study of the blockchain, and identified a very large number of dormant coins, 
what he called ‘zombie coins’, which amount to 30 percent of all the Bitcoins 
ever mined [87]. While it is difficult to ascertain just how many of these coins 
are lost, this is evidence of a serious problem for the viability of Bitcoin. 
It must be said that missing and lost coins has not been seen as a problem for 
enthusiasts, as they point out that each BTC is divisible up to eight decimal 
points. It is also assumed that the fewer BTCs there are, the higher the value. 
Defenders of Bitcoin also point out that it is possible to lose real money. This 
seems disingenuous, as the finality of Bitcoin loss is absolute. People tend to 
know where their wallet is, but are less conscious about files on their 
computer. Similarly, normal consumers do not keep all their money stashed in 
one location. The lack of a failsafe when things inevitably go wrong is a 
serious issue with the scheme. 
The solution to this concern is to keep wallets online, a centralized solution 
that has its own problems, chiefly that one has to rely on unregulated 
intermediary ‘banks’ holding a given wallet. Some online wallets have had 
problems with security and lost coins, not to mention the real possibility of 
fraud. 
3.5. Deflation 
Bitcoin is built with scarcity in mind. The idea is that the scarcity will ensure 
upward valuation of the currency because there is no central bank that can 
print more money, as the economy requires it. The problem with deflation is 
that it encourages hoarding, in which case the currency is not being used as 
intended, namely to exchange goods and services [88]. Moderate inflation is 
desired in a healthy economy because it encourages investment and spending, 
as shown in the recent deflationary crises in Japan and the Eurozone. When 
Bitcoin was experiencing its upward trend, many commentators noted that a 
rise in value meant that it had entered a hyper-deflationary spiral which made 
it uniquely unsuitable as a currency because there was no reason to spend 
BTCs if the price would continue to rise. In the early days of Bitcoin, an 
individual reportedly spent 10,000 bitcoins to buy a pizza. In a deflationary 
economy, this person feels that they lost greatly as the currency’s value goes 
up, and would be less willing to part with their currency in the future. 
A stable currency abhors deflation, otherwise it ceases acting as a medium of 
exchange and becomes akin to scarce commodities, such as diamonds. 
Furthermore, the decentralised nature of Bitcoin makes it uniquely unfit for 
banking [89], which would further encourage hoarding by individuals. 
There is some evidence that hoarding is taking place. Ron and Shamir found 
that the actual number of BTCs in circulation was considerably smaller than 
previously thought, with 78 percent of the entire BTC reserve at the time 
(7,019,100 BTC) placed in “saving” addresses, and only 22 percent of all 
BTCs created (including those lost) in circulation [90]. This confirms the 
suspicion that the system encourages hoarding and accumulation, which make 
it uniquely unsuitable as a currency. A large number of transactions appear to 
consist of operations between the same owner, where the coins are moved 
from one address to another. The data strongly indicates that there is 
considerable ownership concentration in the BTC network. Ron and Shamir 
found that: 
“Thirty-six percent of all owners received fewer than one BTC 
(currently worth about US$12) each throughout their lifetime, 
52 percent received fewer than 10 BTCs and 88 percent fewer 
than 100. At the other end of the distribution there are only four 
owners who received over 800,000 BTCs and 80 owners who 
received over 400,000.” [91] 
The list of BTC owners includes a single unidentified user with 2,886,650 
coins, or more than a quarter of all BTCs issued so far. This hints at hoarding 
by just a few. BTC is not being used as a payment system, but as a commodity 
where users exchange bitcoins for cash and vice versa. 
3.6. Security and BTC theft 
Criminal lawyers and investigators have taken a very significant interest in 
Bitcoin [92]. An aspect of the trust in Bitcoin is its security, touted as a very 
secure and anonymous method of transferring value from one computer to the 
other. The currency works by allocating a public cryptographic key to 
arbitrary units of value held in a non-proprietary client. Because they are 
public, the keys can be inspected by everyone, but a private key is needed to 
make the transaction. These units of value are held in “wallets”, small .dat 
files hosted in the computer. This serves two purposes: as long as the keys are 
secure, only the wallet’s owner will be able to transfer the bitcoins to make a 
payment; the keys make transactions anonymous. 
As with many things online, theory is often defeated by a combination of 
greed, laziness, ignorance and simple intermediary failure. As stated earlier, 
Bitcoin’s cryptography is very strong, so a hacking attack would not be able to 
break the security. But a hacker doesn’t need to defeat the SHA–256 
cryptographic hash in order to remove bitcoins from the wallet, a simple US$5 
dollar wrench would suffice [93]. Practice has been bearing this out. For a 
long time, the Bitcoin client did not encrypt the wallet.dat file itself, which left 
the currency vulnerable to basic hacking attacks [94]. Similarly, hackers began 
successfully targeting the exchanges, managing to steal thousands of BTCs 
[95]. Strong encryption of the scheme does not protect against fraudsters and 
scam artists. The security issues with Bitcoin are hard to assess, but risk 
assessment of various aspects of Bitcoin undertaken by NEMODE, a U.K.-
based research project, has concluded that there are various security issues 
with very high risk, such as general security, subversive miner strategies, loss 
of keys and man-in-the-middle attacks [96]. 
This is a serious problem with the currency. As exchanges and wallets are the 
weakest links in the chain, the currency requires some technical knowledge to 
operate securely, and this could affect average users from adopting the 
currency. This relative insecurity stands in stark contrast with existing 
protection given to traditional banking users [97]. The only BTC recourse is 
reputational: to go online to complain. 
Law enforcement is difficult because agencies may simply not understand the 
technology, not considering it worthy of prosecution. Until there are arrests 
related to BTC fraud and hacking, serious investors might well decide to stay 
away from Bitcoin because it simply is not safe enough, as it draws hackers 
like no other payment system. Bitcoin might therefore be suffering from a lack 
of regulation, something that could be considered ironic, as one of its selling 
points is the distributed nature of the network, which makes it difficult to 
regulate in the first place. 
3.7. Growing centrality 
One of the foundational principles of Bitcoin is its decentralised nature. The 
idea is that value is issued by collaborative mining where all the parties are 
validating transactions in the blockchain. Assuming that thousands of people 
are mining separately, the system remains decentralised and the prospect of a 
single entity gaining control of the network was seen as very remote. 
However, in June 2014 two computer scientists from Cornell University 
sounded the alarm [98], stating that a large mining conglomerate was 
becoming too powerful, and had actually reached 51 percent of all mining 
capacity for Bitcoin during a few hours. Essentially the system was no longer 
decentralised. Any entity controlling 51 percent of the mining power would 
accrue all of the Bitcoins mined while in majority. The controlling mining 
conglomerate could send false information to the blockchain, which would 
amount to altering transaction history [99]. 
As a result, the Bitcoin community panicked, with posts in forums and social 
media urging users of GHash.io, the mining conglomerate involved, to leave 
the pool to avoid it going over 51 percent again. Since the incident, Ghash.io 
made a statement declaring that they would take steps to avoid becoming too 
dominant again [100]. At the time of writing, Ghash.io use decreased to only 
two percent, but other large mining conglomerates have emerged with over 22 
percent of total distribution [101]. 
Many Bitcoin enthusiasts have dismissed centralisation concerns, pointing out 
that the community polices itself adequately. They also note that miners 
migrated to other pools as soon as the 51 percent threshold was crossed [102]. 
More pragmatic developers have proposed technical solutions, such as 
implementing an algorithm that would force nodes to store the entire 
blockchain locally, which would help against a 51 percent conglomerate 
controlling the entire system [103]. 
The truth is that until a long-term technical solution is reached, Bitcoin’s 
decentralised nature relies entirely on the good will of miners. If Bitcoin in its 
present shape reached an important share of the financial market, it would be 
possible for an entity with substantial computing power to take over the entire 
system. The prospect of a government or corporation taking over Bitcoin 
would be a real threat. 
3.8. Computational inefficiency 
A less-explored area of concern with Bitcoin is that, at least as currently 
implemented, it might be energy inefficient. Bitcoin generates value by 
requiring those who participate in the network to dedicate computing power to 
verify transactions. This presents two problems for the scalability of the 
network, namely the computational power required to mine BTC and the size 
of the blockchain itself. 
The computational power dedicated to mining has continued to increase over 
time. In Bitcoin, computing power is called the hash rate, and the unit of 
measure is the hash/second, meaning a calculation per second. Ten tera hashes 
per second (Thash/s) means that the network is performing 10 trillion 
calculations per second, with the hash rate at the time of writing standing at 
over 410 thousand Thash/s. Whichever way you measure it, that is an 
astounding amount of computing power used to produce value. O’Dwyer and 
Malone found that the entire Bitcoin network uses energy equal to that 
consumed in all of Ireland [104]. Even under normal circumstances, such a 
staggering amount of energy expenditure might prompt questions about 
Bitcoin’s carbon footprint and other related environmental problems. Even if 
we ignore environmental issues, it is difficult to justify such consumption on 
economic grounds. O’Dwyer and Malone concluded in 2014 that “the cost of 
Bitcoin mining on commodity hardware now exceeds the value of the 
rewards”. [105] 
Another issue is that the size of the blockchain is starting to become a 
problem. At the time of writing it was reaching 40 gigabytes [106]. This has 
some practical implications for BTC as a currency, as the size of the 
blockchain may hinder the speed at which transactions are verified. Average 
transaction times vary a lot depending on network loads, but currently it 
ranges from 6–12 minutes per transaction [107]. As the blockchain size 
increases with more transactions, hosting of the entire blockchain could 
become a problem as well, as it is thought that the blockchain may reach three 
terabytes in size within 10 years [108]. 
  
 
4. Legal and regulatory issues 
The decentralised nature of Bitcoin and a lack of a clear set of actors may 
prompt some to think that it is not possible or desirable to attempt to regulate 
the electronic currency. The fact that there is no issuing body and no central 
authority in charge of the payment scheme may lead one to believe that it is 
not even possible to undertake any sort of regulatory effort. However, Bitcoin 
has some practices that make some form of regulation necessary if it becomes 
widespread. 
4.1. The legal nature of Bitcoin 
In an episode of the popular TV series The Good Wife, appropriately entitled 
‘Bitcoin for dummies’, a person who acts on behalf of ‘Mr. Bitcoin’, the 
anonymous and mysterious inventor of the cryptocurrency, hires the 
protagonist’s law firm to defend him against a government action. The 
premise of the episode is that the U.S. Department of the Treasury wants to 
find the creator of Bitcoin because the digital currency is illegal in the United 
States. Although a crude depiction of the legalities of currency and 
commodities surrounding Bitcoin, the episode pinpoints some of the most 
pressing legal issues regarding their use. What is their legal status? Are they a 
currency? Are they a commodity? Are they a security? In short, is Bitcoin 
legal? 
There are generally two types of currency from a legal perspective, legal 
tender and legal currency [109]. Legal tender is simply currency that cannot be 
refused in the fulfillment of a debt. Legal currency is money that is recognised 
by the government as a legitimate manner to pay for goods and services. In 
most countries legal currency and legal tender are one and the same, but there 
are some exceptions [110]. For example, there is something called a local 
currency, which is a currency that is usually accepted for payment in a local 
area, within a small number of participating stores [111]. Similarly, in the 
most of the U.K. the Bank of England notes are legal tender, but in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, there are notes issued by several banks which act as 
legal currency. It is also common to see economies with a weak local currency 
accept international reserve currencies (for instance U.S. dollars or Euros) as 
legal currency [112]. 
4.1.1. United States regulatory response 
In the United States, only the U.S. dollar is legal tender [113]. Similarly, only 
the Mint and the Federal Reserve can produce coins and currency, which are 
the only means of legal tender. Title 31 of the U.S. Code does not seem to 
make the distinction between legal currency and legal tender, so they appear to 
be treated in a similar fashion. This is corroborated by several official 
documents that indicate clearly that only the U.S. dollar is allowed as the 
official currency of the United States. According to the F.B.I. “it is a violation 
of federal law for individuals, [...] or organizations,[...] to create private coin 
or currency systems to compete with the official coinage and currency of the 
United States.” [114] It would seem clear that local currencies that may 
compete with the dollar are not allowed, but the question of whether Bitcoin 
can be considered a currency for these purposes is not clear. There does not 
appear to be consensus that BTC would fall foul of regulation designed to 
protect the U.S. dollar as legal tender [115]. On the contrary, there have been 
electronic payment systems in existence for over a decade and there have not 
been attempts to curb them by using counterfeiting legislation [116]. 
However, all of the above does not mean that Bitcoin is illegal in the U.S. 
Because of many of the problems highlighted earlier, BTC is not currently 
used as a currency, perhaps with the exception of Web sites dealing in illegal 
goods in the ‘dark Web’ [117]. Bitcoin should be treated more like a 
speculative vehicle, more akin to securities or commodities, in which case its 
possible definition as a currency would not be necessary. Yang [118] makes a 
very strong case that Bitcoin can be considered a security under U.S. law, 
particularly because the definitions of a security present in the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are broad enough to include 
all sort of bonds, debentures and certificates of interest as well as investment 
contracts. The very open definition was eventually used to classify as a 
security unusual investment contracts, such as citrus trees and earthworms 
[119]. The U.S. Supreme Court [120] has specifically defined an investment 
contract as an agreement that must involve “(1) an investment of money; (2) a 
common enterprise; and (3) an expectation of profits to derive solely from the 
efforts of others.” [121] Yang argues that Bitcoin fulfills all of these three 
requirements, and therefore can easily be classified as a security, at least until 
the law changes to classify it more adequately. It would also be easy for 
Bitcoin to be treated as a commodity under the broad definition present in the 
Commodity Exchange Act 1936, which offers a long list of goods that ends 
with the phrase “and all other goods and articles” [122]. 
4.1.2. European regulatory response 
The situation in Europe and the U.K. is less ambiguous than in the U.S. First, 
there is considerably more regulatory acceptance for alternative currencies to 
those issued by central banks authorities, as evidenced by the aforementioned 
example of national legal currencies in the U.K., and a generally forgiving 
position for local currencies, such as the Bristol Pound, Brixton Pound and 
Lewes Pound [123]. These are very small payment schemes where a few 
participating retailers accept a note which acts more like a voucher and it is 
usually of very limited circulation. While BTC is larger by many degrees of 
magnitude, there does not seem to be any indication from regulators and 
central banking authorities in Europe that there will be a crackdown on Bitcoin 
over its legal status [124]. 
Second, Europe has already in place a legal framework for the regulation of 
electronic money, which could be used to cover virtual currencies such as 
Bitcoin. The Electronic Money Institutions Directive 2009/110/EC [125] 
contains rules for all sorts of electronic purses that can be used to store value 
in an electronic format, be it via a computer, a mobile device or online. The 
Directive defines electronic money thus (paraphrased for clarity): 
1. electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value; 
2. as represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of 
funds for the purpose of making payment transactions; 
3. the transaction is an act, initiated by the payer or by the payee, of 
placing, transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespective of any 
underlying obligations between the payer and the payee; 
4. which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic 
money issuer. 
If a payment system fulfils these requirements, then it is considered electronic 
money, and only electronic money institutions (EMI) can issue electronic 
value. There is a high threshold for an electronic money institution, as the EMI 
would have to fulfil quite a number of requirements. The idea behind this 
stringent regulation is evident, as what is taking place is the issuing of value 
into the economy. Bitcoin would meet the legal definition to a certain extent, 
with the exception that it is not money that is issued in the sense that is meant 
by the Directive. As there is no central issuing authority, then it would be 
difficult to envision how financial services authorities in charge of regulating 
EMIs could intervene with regards to Bitcoin. If Bitcoins are not an EMI in 
Europe, then their status as currency is in doubt. The European Banking 
Authority (EBA) has opined that virtual currencies (VCs) do not fulfil many of 
the requirements of a currency, and therefore should not be considered legal 
tender: 
“VCs are not legal tender, which means the following features 
are not fulfilled: (a) mandatory acceptance, i.e., that the creditor 
of a payment obligation cannot refuse currency unless the 
parties have agreed on other means of payment; (b) acceptance 
at full face value, i.e., the monetary value is equal to the amount 
indicated; and (c) that the currency has the power to discharge 
debtors from their payment obligations.” [126] 
While it does not state directly, the EBA opinion infers Bitcoin being a 
commodity that can be exchanged for fiat money. 
4.2. Regulatory actions to date 
As some of the legalities surrounding Bitcoin are still not fully clear, there is 
still considerable scope for legislators and regulators to try to tackle the 
problems that might arise from the use of virtual currencies. Bitcoin users are 
learning the hard way why financial markets and currencies are heavily 
regulated areas. Deposit taking, the keeping of accounts, management of 
payment transactions, keeping of balances, all of these are functions of 
financial institutions that are of the utmost importance to businesses and 
consumers. The economy relies on financial intermediaries to operate and 
regulation is designed to prevent damage to consumers. 
Regulators have been cautious in tackling some of the legal questions exposed 
by the emergence of cryptocurrencies. Part of the appeal of the payment 
system is that it is completely decentralised. Just as with P2P file sharing, you 
could shut down the entire Bitcoin intermediaries tomorrow and the network 
would still run because it does not depend on a central system. Bitcoin may 
very well be illegal, but almost impossible to shut down in any efficient 
manner, as a distributed network [127]. 
So what could regulators do? Based on Mayer-Schönberger and Crowley 
[128], we construct four scenarios for virtual currencies: 
1. ‘Virtual sovereigns’: virtual currency providers will serve as regulators 
by enforcing the terms of their contracts with users to prevent cyber-
fraud and ensure proper behaviour. 
2. Prohibition: governments could try to block their citizens from using 
virtual currencies that don’t abide by government restrictions and 
regulations (governments have not been able to completely block 
access to Web sites nor will total prohibition on virtual currencies 
succeed). 
3. Selective prohibition: government minimize the real-world impact of 
virtual currencies by, for instance, banning the sale of real-world goods 
for virtual currency. This section would also cover the banning and/or 
criminalisation of the use of the currency to pay for illegal activities or 
for money laundering. 
4. Selective regulation: regulators impose some restrictions to specific 
aspects of virtual currencies, such as taxation and the regulation of 
intermediaries. 
5. ‘Real-world assisted virtual currency self-governance’: governments 
provide support for mechanisms whereby users of virtual currencies 
can agree upon and enforce their own ‘community standards’ and rules 
of conduct. 
Note that ‘do-nothing’ option is a minor variant on Option 4 [129]. 
4.2.1. Virtual sovereigns 
During the first few years of the existence of cryptocurrencies, the lack of any 
meaningful regulation or enforcement meant that intermediaries were left to 
self-regulate through terms of use and policies [130]. Interestingly, some 
commentators and participants in the economy advocate for either minimal 
regulation or to continue with the virtual sovereign approach [131]. The 
problem with this is that at the moment self-regulation has been translated into 
economic losses for unsuspecting users, as many exchanges and intermediaries 
were operating haphazardly or even fraudulently. 
Lack of regulation of the sector has translated into a fertile ground for 
fraudsters and scam artists, from the existence of phishing sites passing off as 
exchanges [132], to online wallet services going bust. But the biggest example 
of the failure of self-regulation has to be the case of Mt. Gox. Mt. Gox was 
forced to file for bankruptcy in Japan after hackers allegedly managed to get 
into their system and steal US$446 million worth of bitcoins [133]. Some 
claim the site was riding a wave of speculation with coins that it did not have, 
accruing a large amount of debt. This is precisely the type of practice that 
regulation is supposed to stem. 
4.2.2. Prohibition and selective prohibition 
It should not be surprising that there has not been a regulatory push towards 
outright outlawing of Bitcoin, or any other cryptocurrency for that matter. 
There is no reason to suspect that governments feel threatened enough by 
Bitcoin at this time to warrant some form of ban, but most importantly, such 
an action could prove futile given the currency’s decentralised nature [134]. 
Attempts at some partial prohibition of specific elements of the technology 
have been made. Thailand has attempted an outright ban on Bitcoin, although 
unsuccessfully. In 2013 a Thai company called Bitcoin Co. Ltd. was trying to 
register to operate in Thailand exchanging local currency for BTC, but the 
Foreign Exchange Administration and Policy Department declared that 
selling, buying, trading, exchanging and transferring bitcoins outside or within 
the country were illegal activities [135]. However, trading was re-opened six 
months later when the Bank of Thailand decided that the Foreign Exchange 
Administration lacked competence to ban BTC trading [136]. Russian 
regulators made some noise about cracking down on BTC trading but these 
never really materialised [137]. China has been the only jurisdiction to 
successfully attempt a major crackdown of Bitcoin. In December 2013, 
responding to claims of theft and fraud to Chinese nationals using BTC, the 
People’s Bank of China made an announcement regarding Bitcoin in order to 
“protect the public’s property rights, to protect RMB’s official currency status, 
to prevent money laundering risk and to protect financial stability.” [138] The 
statement contains two very interesting measures. Firstly, it classifies BTC as 
a commodity and clearly disavows it as any type of currency. Then it seriously 
curbs its viability by restricting the way in which financial institutions may use 
it. The statement reads: 
“At this stage, all financial institutions and payment institutions 
must not use Bitcoin to set price for product or services, not buy 
or sell Bitcoins, not act as a market maker for Bitcoins, not 
underwrite insurance related to Bitcoin or cover Bitcoin in 
insurance, not directly or indirectly provide other Bitcoin related 
services, including registering, trading, clearing, settlement; not 
accept Bitcoin or use Bitcoin as payment tool; not start a Bitcoin 
and RMB or foreign currency exchange; not start a Bitcoin 
saving, trust or mortgage service; not issue Bitcoin related 
financial services; not use Bitcoin as the investment in trusts or 
funds.” 
While this is not a prohibition, it effectively restricted most of the currency-
like functions of Bitcoin, as it could not be used to clear settlements or to 
make payments. The above meant that BTC operators could mostly trade it as 
a commodity, leaving out most other functions. It is curious that the 
announcement coincided with BTC’s highest trading month and helped to 
push down prices considerably, heralding a crash that halved the price in less 
than a month [139]. 
It must be said that while the Chinese crackdown had some adverse effects on 
the use of Bitcoin as a currency [140], it is still being traded in China and the 
most active exchange is Chinese [141]. The yuan has overtaken the dollar as 
the top traded exchange currency in the Bitcoin economy [142]. The reason 
for this might be counterintuitive if we think of Bitcoin as a currency, but it 
makes sense if we see it as a commodity. BTC’s popularity in China may be 
attributed to for domestic investors because, according to some analysts, 
“[t]here is not much else one can invest in.” [143] 
4.2.3. Selective regulation 
Most of the regulatory responses so far have been related to taxation, and even 
these have been rather low key in comparison to the Chinese experiment 
[144]. In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) issued guidelines specified that decentralized currencies should 
comply with money laundering regulations [145]. In the U.K., Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) issued a briefing paper detailing its position 
on the tax treatment of income received from, and charges made in connection 
with, activities involving Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies [146]. The 
HMRC recognises that this is an evolving regulatory area and is expecting that 
at some point there will be some sort of EU-wide effort to define and clarify 
cryptocurrencies in general. HMRC has in the interim decided to treat income 
from sales of goods and services through Bitcoin in the same manner as it does 
any other sales. With regards to other income, they issued the following 
guidelines for the time being: 
1. “Income received from Bitcoin mining activities will 
generally be outside the scope of VAT on the basis that the 
activity does not constitute an economic activity for VAT 
purposes because there is an insufficient link between any 
services provided and any consideration received. 
2. Income received by miners for other activities, such as for the 
provision of services in connection with the verification of 
specific transactions for which specific charges are made, will 
be exempt from VAT under Article 135(1)(d) of the EU VAT 
Directive as falling within the definition of ‘transactions, 
including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, 
payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable 
instruments.’ 
3. When Bitcoin is exchanged for Sterling or for foreign 
currencies, such as Euros or Dollars, no VAT will be due on the 
value of the Bitcoins themselves. 
4. Charges (in whatever form) made over and above the value of 
the Bitcoin for arranging or carrying out any transactions in 
Bitcoin will be exempt from VAT under Article 135(1)(d) as 
outlined at 2 above.” 
This brings it in line with other foreign currencies, and could be considered to 
be an official recognition of BTC’s status as yet another currency in the eyes 
of the law. However, as it has been mentioned repeatedly, Bitcoin is not 
behaving like a currency, continuing to behave mostly like a commodity. 
This would bring it under the umbrella of securities and commodities 
regulators, such as the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the 
Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) in the U.S. While these 
entities have not made any attempts to regulate Bitcoin directly, the SEC has 
imposed sanctions on unauthorised traders operating securities online for 
Bitcoin and Litecoin [147]. The SEC is also studying the approval of several 
securities companies operating as mutual fund and other Bitcoin-related 
financial instruments [148]. Finally, the SEC has issued a strongly worded 
statement warning investors interested in Bitcoin [149]. In it they point out 
some of the issues that we have enumerated earlier, such as the problem with 
the potential for losing bitcoins, lack of recourse if something goes wrong, and 
security concerns. They comment: 
“Both fraudsters and promoters of high-risk investment schemes 
may target Bitcoin users. The exchange rate of U.S. dollars to 
bitcoins has fluctuated dramatically since the first bitcoins were 
created. As the exchange rate of Bitcoin is significantly higher 
today, many early adopters of Bitcoin may have experienced an 
unexpected increase in wealth, making them attractive targets 
for fraudsters as well as promoters of high-risk investment 
opportunities.” 
European authorities seems to echo the warnings to consumers, with the 
European Banking Authority issuing a detailed list of potential risks for both 
consumers and investors that include many of those cited already, including 
monetary loss due to fraud, price instability, theft and the user’s inexperience, 
which makes consumers unable to assess risk adequately [150]. 
4.2.5. Do nothing 
The fact that there is little evidence of any growth in the use of BTC as a 
currency may be the reason why there have been minimal attempts to regulate 
it. The reason for this could be simply that the BTC market is just too small to 
warrant any wide-ranging regulatory effort. It is also possible that regulators 
simply do not understand the technology and its implications, awaiting any 
further developments to act. 
Many regulators seem to be adopting the wait-and-see approach. Japanese 
authorities have stated [151] that they will monitor for illegal activity with 
Bitcoins, but will not regulate them for the time being. Similarly, Canadian 
regulators explain: 
“There could be potential risks to overall financial stability if 
Bitcoin became a significant means of payment and the Bitcoin 
system remained unstable [...] users need to be aware of the 
potential financial risks to which they might be exposed, in light 
of the ongoing volatility of bitcoin prices and the risk of failure 
of Bitcoin exchanges.” [152] 
However, there is concern that not taking any action will backfire on 
regulators. There are stories about illegal activities using Bitcoins, which 
eventually may prompt some form of action, at least to be seen as doing 
something to discourage blatant criminal activities. Similarly, news about 
fraud and exchanges becoming insolvent might also prompt some sort of 
action. Having provided a long list of risks for investors, users and financial 
institutions, the European Banking Authority issued the following warning to 
regulators against doing nothing: 
“Regulators themselves incur risks regardless of whether or not 
they do anything at all, deliberately decide not to regulate or 
decide to regulate but the approach fails. The risks may be of a 
legal nature, of a reputational nature or because the activity 
undermines one or more of the regulator’s objectives. Unlike the 
risks in the previous categories, the mitigation of the risks listed 
below is firmly in the hands of the regulators.” [153] 
The argument from the European Banking Authority is that regulators could 
see their reputation diminished if they allow illegal or fraudulent activity to go 
unchecked, but they would also be facing legal action due to inactivity. The 
choice then is to take some form of regulation. 
4.2.6. Specific regulation proposals 
A few specific regulatory proposals of note have been drafted. The California 
legislature is considering a virtual currency bill [154], which mostly creates a 
requirement for registration to the relevant regulator body for any person or 
institution wishing to engage in any virtual currency business. The bill defines 
virtual currency as “any type of digital unit that is used as a medium of 
exchange or a form of digitally stored”, but excludes units used in online 
games, or other digital units that “cannot be converted into, or redeemed for, 
fiat currency.” This would tend to exclude vouchers, loyalty points and air 
miles. Bodies trading in digital currencies must obtain a licence to operate. 
One of the most important regulatory developments in France was a 2014 
report by the Minister of Finance, Michel Sapin [155]. While French 
authorities admit that Bitcoin does not pose a threat to financial markets, they 
have recognised that there is clearly room for concern with regards to criminal 
activity and fraud. These concerns are mostly about the anonymity of 
transactions, which could have tax and money laundering implications. 
Therefore, France has made clear regulatory direction with regards to virtual 
currencies. These are: 
1. Limit anonymity by making it mandatory for intermediaries and 
exchanges to require proof of identity upon opening an account. 
2. Clarify the taxation of virtual currencies with the publication of a set of 
instructions for consumers and regulators. 
3. Propose a European-wide approach to Value Added Tax (VAT). 
4. Propose, after discussion with industry, to cap payments in virtual 
currencies, similar to existing caps on cash payments. 
5. Regulate at European level platforms that exchange virtual currencies 
against the official currency. 
These measures are substantial and substantive, particularly with regards to 
anonymity and the requirement for identification. It will be interesting to see if 
such measures act as a deterrent against the creation of new intermediaries in 
France. 
The European Banking Authority followed the lead of the French 
recommendations. In their aforementioned report on virtual currencies, they 
also listed a detailed number of possible regulatory responses to the challenges 
posed by virtual currencies [156]. Some of the main proposals include the 
following: 
• Creation of a scheme governance authority. This will be a non-
governmental entity that will be accountable to regulators and it will 
institution that will be a mandatory requirement for virtual currencies, 
which will therefore operate as a financial institution. The authority 
will act as a central body that will have the responsibility of 
maintaining the public ledger and manage the currency’s protocol(s). 
• Customer due diligence (CDD) requirements. Exchanges and other 
consumer-facing intermediaries will have to collect identifying 
information. 
• Fitness and probity standards. To diminish the chance of fraudulent 
activity, participating entities and individuals will have to pass probity 
standards present in other financial sector entities. 
• Mandatory incorporation. Participating entities must be incorporated 
to ensure accountability and liability. 
• Transparent price formation and requirements against market abuse. 
To avoid market manipulation and insider trading, intermediaries must 
comply with existing regulation against such practices in the financial 
sector. 
• Authorisation requirements. Market participants must register to the 
relevant regulator and/or scheme governance authority, and must be 
authorised to operate. 
• A global regulatory approach. Because of the international nature of 
VCs, there needs to be a coordinated international response by 
regulators around the world. 
• Evidence of secure IT systems. Self-explanatory and required by 
independent audit. 
• Other standard procedures in financial institutions. There are various 
proposals that are standard requirement for financial institutions. These 
include having a corporate governance scheme, operating with 
minimum required funds and separating client account currency from 
their own VCs. 
Some of these proposals are nothing more than an attempt to bring VC 
institutions into the fold of the wider regulatory framework already in 
existence in the financial sector in general. Some of these could be easily 
adopted in the existing Bitcoin economy, such as requiring exchanges to 
register to authorities. Some will be more difficult to achieve and might very 
well destroy some of the unique features present in cryptocurrencies that make 
them so appealing to some in the first place. Needless to say, requiring the 
existence of a central body is anathema to the ethos of cryptocurrencies. 
Similarly, increased scrutiny comes at a price; these suggestions might 
increase transaction costs as well. 
It is not possible at the moment to foresee what will happen next. If 
cryptocurrencies remain a niche interest by the technical elites, then it is 
difficult to foresee that any of the above recommendations will be 
implemented. If on the other hand Bitcoin and other VCs finally become 
widespread, then there will surely be some sort of regulation at some point. 
  
 
5. Alternative uses of blockchain protocols 
A blockchain is quite simply any open, cryptographic, decentralised ledger, so 
in theory it can be implemented into any sort of scheme, financial or not, that 
requires a record of transactions. As has been stated repeatedly, in Bitcoin the 
ledger is public and decentralised. Since anyone can check past, present and 
proposed transactions, there is increased reliability in the system. The main 
function of the blockchain in Bitcoin is to avoid the potential of double-
spending money. However, the blockchain idea is independent of the existence 
of Bitcoin. In the off-line world, barring counterfeiting, it is impossible to 
double-spend money as people hold limited amounts of physical currency. 
Monetary transactions however more often occur as the digital movement of 
value from one account to the other [157]. The idea is for the holding 
institution to contain a master ledger, in other words a record of the money in 
all of the accounts, making it possible to follow movements from one to the 
other [158]. 
In order to have a viable blockchain alternative outside of the Bitcoin 
implementation, a developer can use existing protocols and open source code 
to create a verification mechanism that must fulfil three important functions 
key to any blockchain distribution. These are: 
• Proof of work. The proof of work (POW) is the way in which Bitcoin 
rewards miners for conducting transaction verification operations, 
which are expensive computational transactions. Any blockchain 
alternative will have to have an alternative POW pay-out if the 
intention of the technology is not monetary. This could be social, such 
as solving mathematical equations or finding prime numbers [159]. 
• Authentication. This is the main function of a blockchain, the 
implementation must be designed to validate transactions securely and 
unequivocally [160]. 
• Decentralization. The blockchain must be decentralized, so copies of 
the entire ledger cannot be held centrally. This presents a few technical 
problems, such as the increasingly unmanageable size of the 
blockchain as more transactions accumulate [161]. 
There are hundreds of such potential applications in the financial markets, 
such as bonds, stocks and derivatives [162]; but it would also be possible to 
apply the same type of technology to automated contracts [163], or even 
copyright licensing agreements [164]. The idea is to attempt to bypass the 
difficulties of contract formation and other legal transactions by allocating 
rights and responsibilities through electronic tokens that then would be 
recorded in a common ledger. A recent report explains: 
“While all of the high-value applications of the first wave of 
blockchain innovation are explicitly financial, this is not the 
case for the second wave of blockchain innovation, which 
primarily rests on the idea of a ‘smart contract.’ Put simply, a 
smart contract uses software code to implement human 
intentions by dynamically carrying out instructions embedded in 
tokens associated with a contract, rather than relying on legal 
texts interpreted by courts, regulatory bodies or other legal 
institutions.” [165] 
But this would not only apply to contracts, but also to distributing and 
allocating rights within decentralised organizations themselves [166]. 
There are already a number of tools that are being developed to take advantage 
of the blockchain beyond payment systems and cryptocurrencies. One of the 
most publicised has been Project Ethereum [167] which creates “a blockchain 
with a built-in Turing-complete programming language, allowing anyone to 
write smart contracts and decentralized applications where they can create 
their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction formats and state transition 
functions.” [168] In other words, Ethereum is a protocol for smart open 
ledgers where users can allocate their own rules and values. Ethereum has 
released an open source mining application to the public, directed mostly at 
developers, and users can mine its own currency called “ether” by allocating 
processing power to validate transactions. The system allows users to create 
legal documents that can be validated through the blockchain while at the 
same time allowing users to mine the new currency. 
D-CENT (Decentralised Citizens ENgagement Technologies) is an European 
Union (http://dcentproject.eu/) project that has proposed the creation of a 
social blockchain toolset that will allow adopters to generate their own 
alternative currency. The interesting part of this scheme is that it changes the 
economically-minded proof of work with a social one, which will be decided 
upon by the community [169]. Another project called Chain [170] is proposing 
to use blockchain protocols to pay for mobile minutes, verify energy credits, 
store loyalty points and scrutinise securities. Many other projects are being 
announced routinely, with applications as varied as smart solar panels [171] 
and assistance to operate stock markets [172]. 
While these proposals are very interesting, IT law is replete with grandiose 
claims of life-changing technologies that will revolutionise lives. It is often too 
easy to fall prey to the latest meme adopted by some commentator [173]. Talk 
of the blockchain is reaching the level that previous technologies received, 
such as the cloud and 3D printing. While the reach of these is indeed great, we 
cannot lose sight of the limitations that exist within the Bitcoin environment. 
Furthermore, the idea of conducting legal transactions automatically by means 
of smart contracts and intelligent agents is not new [174]. Every generation 
brings a new crop of suggestions, claiming that we are about to make lawyers 
a thing of the past, with most transactions completed by computers, yet the 
legal profession persists [175]. 
Despite this critique of the Bitcoin meme hype, the blockchain itself has 
immense potential, particularly for transactions that require transparency, 
resilience and decentralisation. 
  
 6. Conclusions 
This paper examined several areas related to cryptocurrencies. First, we 
outlined the basics of cryptocurrencies for a non-specialist audience. Second, 
we looked at the advantages presented by Bitcoin and examined problems 
with implementation. We then turned in depth to the practical and regulatory 
challenges presented by Bitcoin and crypto-currencies in general. 
We conclude that though Bitcoin may be the equivalent of Second Life a 
decade later, a liberating technology that is overhyped and poorly executed, so 
blockchains may be the equivalent of Web 2.0 social networks, a truly 
transformative social technology. In the last year there has been a marked shift 
in the rhetoric emerging from the Bitcoin camp. While there are still (and 
probably will ever be) a core group of enthusiasts who believe in the 
cryptocurrency with a fervour matched only by the Free Software movement, 
Bitcoin has not matched the expectations of some proponents. Various 
crashes, and wave after wave of scandals and allegations of fraud have 
decidedly dented the perception that Bitcoin is the currency of the future. The 
relative difficulty in acquiring and spending BTC has meant that it has 
continued to elude mainstream acceptance. At the same, there are other 
electronic payment methods such as Apple Pay [176], launched in 2015. 
While Bitcoin may well recede from the public imagination in the future as a 
virtual currency, one aspect of the scheme is gaining momentum. It is the idea 
of a transparent, distributed and decentralised transaction ledger: the 
blockchain. 
It is decreasingly accurate to call Bitcoin a currency. Money is a unit of 
account, store of value and medium of exchange. Bitcoin is none of those, in 
any serious sense. Bitcoin has too many problems to be the solution. An 
anonymous and decentralized payment system could indeed revolutionise the 
economy, help to end the disproportionate power of some banking systems 
and democratise monetary exchange. A system created by an anonymous 
cryptographer may not be the way of the future; true openness is needed for 
the next experiment to be successful. 
The most interesting development arising from Bitcoin has nothing to do with 
the currency itself or with regulation. It is an idea that turns the blockchain, 
Bitcoin’s proof-of-transaction open log, into a platform for creating a smart 
contract decentralised platform. We may very well be talking about 
blockchain in the future with Bitcoin as the first implementation of an open 
ledger. 
Bitcoin is a revolutionary idea in achieving decentralisation, but the current 
implementation suffers from libertarian economic dogma and critical 
mistakes, such as the potential for a large entity with access to large 
computing power to control the public records. The blockchain could bring 
everything that is good about Bitcoin and translate it into decentralised 
applications. This will certainly merit further disinterested independent 
research in the future, separated from the hype and financial self-interest of the 
Bitcoin community. 
The wider research questions relate to the future of fiat currencies and the 
possibility of social production and sharing based on blockchains as the basis 
for the record of exchange [177]. Some proponents of blockchains and social 
production suggest it may supplant increasingly distrusted sovereign 
currencies [178]. Our research has been more limited to a critical exploration 
of the use of the first widely adopted non-proprietorial virtual currency, 
Bitcoin. We must remember that in the late nineteenth century that there was a 
fierce, agriculturally based mass resistance to fiat money, which failed. 
Overblown claims about blockchain enabled virtual currencies may similarly 
fall by the wayside with less mass mobilisation online or off-line. As a site of 
resistance to free market dogma, virtual currencies may be limited, but as an 
organising principle for cooperative sharing alongside the sovereign fiat 
currency capitalist market, it may have a stronger, if niche, future, just as 
cooperative movements gained coexistence with mass consumer capitalism in 
the previous 150 years. A new form of cooperative commons online may be 
enabled by blockchains, but it will most likely not be built on Bitcoins for the 
reasons we have identified in this paper.  
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